1. How many years have you spent in private practice advising clients on antitrust matters?
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* In which jurisdiction do you practice? (ALL THE SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS WILL REFER TO THE JURISDICTION YOU SELECT- IF YOU OPERATE IN MORE THAN ONE, SELECT THE ONE IN WHICH YOU OPERATE THE MOST) |
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| Please provide a rough estimate of the number of senior partners that practice antitrust/competition law in the jurisdiction you selected as your jursdiction. | | |
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4. Enforcement bodies are usually, though not always, granted formal independence from the executive. However, in practice political institutions may be able to influence their activities and their decisions. We are interested in your opinion about the degree of effective independence of the body/bodies that enforce competition legislation in your jurisdiction from interferences from political institutions.
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* How would you rate the degree of effective independence of the body (bodies) responsible for enforcing the competition legislation in your jurisdiction?
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* On the basis of your experience, how has the above degree of effective independence changed in the last seven years? |
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If the degree of effective independence is now higher (lower) than seven years ago, could you indicate what innovations/changes have influenced such increase (decrease)? |
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| Change in the national legislation | | | | Change in the federal legislation | | | | Change in the EU legislation | | | | Change in the composition of the Board of the enforcement body | | |
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* If in your jurisdiction there is a separation between prosecutor and adjudicator when antitrust cases are decided upon, we would like to know your opinion on whether this division of role is just formal or if it is effective. How independent is the adjudicator from the prosecutor? |
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9. Questions from 9 to 15 refer to the enforcement of the prohibition of hard-core cartels.
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* On the basis of your experience in advising firms which have been investigated for participation in a hard-core cartel in the last seven years, what are the most common causes for committing such an infringement? Please rank the causes listed below from 1 to 3 (with 1 most common and 3 least common) |
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Ignorance of the legislation |
| | Ambiguity in the legislation and/or in the decisions of the relevant enforcement body |
| | Disregard of the legislation in pursuit of corporate gain |
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* Suppose that a firm does participate in a hard-core cartel. What is, in your opinion, the probability that this infringement is detected (through an own-initiative investigation, a complaint or a self-report by a whistleblower) and a formal investigation on it is opened? We are only interested in the probability of an infringement being detected and investigated, independently of the result of the investigation (i.e. whether the firm is convicted or acquitted).
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* On the basis of your experience, how has the above probability of detection and investigation of hard-core cartels changed in the last seven years? |
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* Suppose that a firm does participate in a hard-core cartel, and that the relevant enforcement body detects this behaviour and opens a formal investigation on it. What is, in your opinion, the probability that the guilty firm will be found guilty and that this decision is not going to be reversed in an appeal? |
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* On the basis of your experience, how has the above probability of conviction changed in the last seven years? |
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* Suppose that a firm is investigated for participating in a hard-core cartel, but that the firm is actually not guilty of this behaviour. What is, in your opinion, the probability that the non-guilty firm will be acquitted, if not by the relevant competition enforcement body at least in an appeal proceeding? |
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* On the basis of your experience, how has the above probability of acquittal when not guilty of participating in a hard core cartel changed in the last seven years? |
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16. Questions from 16 to 22 refer to the enforcement of the prohibition of abuses of dominant position.
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* On the basis of your experience in advising firms which have been investigated for abuses of dominant positions in the last seven years, what are the most common causes for committing such an infringement? Please rank the causes listed below from 1 to 3 (with 1 most common and 3 least common). |
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Ignorance of the legislation |
| | Ambiguity in the legislation and/or in the decisions of the relevant enforcement body |
| | Disregard of the legislation in pursuit of corporate gain |
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* Suppose that a firm does abuse its dominant position. What is, in your opinion, the probability that this infringement is detected and a formal investigation on it is opened? We are only interested in the probability of an infringement being detected and investigated, independently of the result of the investigation (i.e. whether the firm is convicted or acquitted). |
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* On the basis of your experience, how has the above probability of detection and investigation of abuses of dominant positions changed in the last seven years?
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* Suppose that a firm does abuse its dominant position, and that the relevant enforcement body detects this behaviour and opens a formal investigation on it. What is, in your opinion, the probability that the guilty firm will be found guilty and that this decision is not going to be reversed in an appeal? |
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* On the basis of your experience, how has the above probability of conviction changed in the last seven years? |
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* Suppose that a firm is investigated for an abuse of dominant position, but that the firm is actually not guilty of this behaviour. What is, in your opinion, the probability that the non-guilty firm will be acquitted, if not by the relevant competition enforcement body at least in an appeal proceeding? |
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* On the basis of your experience, how has the above probability of acquittal when not guilty of abusing a dominant position changed in the last seven years? |
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23. Questions from 23 to 29 refer to the enforcement of the prohibition of other anticompetitive agreements i.e. anticompetitive agreements other than hard-cor cartels.
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* On the basis of your experience in advising firms which have been investigated for participating in anticompetitive agreements other than hard-core cartels in the last seven years, what are the most common causes for committing such an infringement? Please rank the causes listed below from 1 to 3 (with 1 most common and 3 least common). |
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Ignorance of the legislation |
| | Ambiguity in the legislation and/or in the decisions of the relevant enforcement body |
| | Disregard of the legislation in pursuit of corporate gain |
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* Suppose that a firm does participate in an anticompetitive agreement other than a hard-core cartel. What is, in your opinion, the probability that this infringement is detected and a formal investigation on it is opened? We are only interested in the probability of an infringement being detected and investigated, independently of the result of the investigation (i.e. whether the firm is convicted or acquitted). |
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* On the basis of your experience, how has the above probability of detection and investigation of anticompetitive agreements other than hard-core cartels changed in the last seven years? |
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* Suppose that a firm does participate in an anticompetitive agreement other than a hard-core cartel, and that the relevant enforcement body detects this behaviour and opens a formal investigation on it. What is, in your opinion, the probability that the guilty firm will be found guilty and that this decision is not going to be reversed in an appeal? |
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* On the basis of your experience, how has the above probability of conviction changed in the last seven years?
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* Suppose that a firm is investigated for participating in an anticompetitive agreement other than a hard-core cartel, but that the firm is actually not guilty of this behaviour. What is, in your opinion, the probability that the non-guilty firm will be acquitted, if not by the relevant competition enforcement body at least in an appeal proceeding? |
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* On the basis of your experience, how has the above probability of acquittal when not guilty of participating in an anticompetitive agreement other than a hard-core cartel changed in the last seven years? |
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30. Questions 30-32 ask your opinion on the deterrence of anticompetitve behaviours. In your opinion, how effective it is the threat of the enforcement of the competition legislation (and of its sanctions) in deterring: A) hard-core cartels, B ) abuses of dominant posision, C) other anti-competitive agreements in your jurisdiction? Please give a separate answer for each type of anti-competitive behaviour.
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* 31. B) abuses of dominant position |
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* 32. C) other anti-competitive agreements |
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33. This question asks your opnion on the deterrence of competitve behaviours.
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* How often does the threat of the enforcement of the competition legislation (and of its sanctions) erroneously deters competitive behaviours in your jurisdiction (i.e. induce firms to refrain from adopting conducts that would not reduce, impair or distort competition)? |
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During the last seven years you will have advised firms who were considering the possibility of a merger (or acquisition) on the likelihood and nature of the antitrust risks of the deal. Out of this possible mergers (or acquisitions) some may have been abandoned, we are interested in understanding the main reasons that led to this decision. On the basis of your experience, in the last seven years what are the most common causes that have led to possible mergers (or acquisition) being abandoned? Please rank the causes listed below from 1 to 4 (with 1 most common and 4 least common). |
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Risk of the merger being blocked because of anti-competitive effects |
| | Cost of the remedies that could have been imposed to limit the anti-competitive effects |
| | Lenght of the proceedings for having a merger approved |
| | Cost of the proceeding for having a merger approved |
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* How often do firms abandon mergers that would have not reduced competition because of at least one of the reasons listed in the question above? |
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| Name | | | | Law firm/Affiliation | | | | Email | | | | Telephone | | | | Fax | | |
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