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Questionnaire for competition law practitioners
 
1. 
How many years have you spent in private practice advising clients on antitrust matters?
*  
 
Less than 5 years
 
Between 5 and 10 years
 
Over 10 years
 
 
2. 
* In which jurisdiction do you practice? (ALL THE SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS WILL REFER TO THE JURISDICTION YOU SELECT- IF YOU OPERATE IN MORE THAN ONE, SELECT THE ONE IN WHICH YOU OPERATE THE MOST)
 
Australia
 
Canada
 
Czech Republic
 
EU
 
France
 
Germany
 
Greece
 
Hungary
 
Italy
 
Japan
 
Netherlands
 
Spain
 
Sweden
 
UK
 
US
 
 
 
Please provide a rough estimate of the number of senior partners that practice antitrust/competition law in the jurisdiction you selected as your jursdiction.
   
 
 
4. 
Enforcement bodies are usually, though not always, granted formal independence from the executive. However, in practice political institutions may be able to influence their activities and their decisions. We are interested in your opinion about the degree of effective independence of the body/bodies that enforce competition legislation in your jurisdiction from interferences from political institutions.
* How would you rate the degree of effective independence of the body (bodies) responsible for enforcing the competition legislation in your jurisdiction?

 
Very low
 
Low
 
Medium
 
High
 
Very High
 
Do not know
 
 
5. 
* On the basis of your experience, how has the above degree of effective independence changed in the last seven years?
 
It is now higher than seven years ago
 
It is now lower than seven years ago
 
It is now the same as seven years ago
 
Do not know
 
 
6. 
If the degree of effective independence is now higher (lower) than seven years ago, could you indicate what innovations/changes have influenced such increase (decrease)?
 
Change in the national legislation
 
Change in the federal legislation
 
Change in the EU legislation
 
Change in the composition of the Board/Head of the enforcement body
 
Do not know

 
 
 
Change in the national legislation
   
Change in the federal legislation
   
Change in the EU legislation
   
Change in the composition of the Board of the enforcement body
   
 
 
8. 
* If in your jurisdiction there is a separation between prosecutor and adjudicator when antitrust cases are decided upon, we would like to know your opinion on whether this division of role is just formal or if it is effective. How independent is the adjudicator from the prosecutor?
 
Very independent
 
Moderately independent
 
Not very independent
 
Not independent at all
 
Do not know
 
Not applicable, as adjudicator and prosecutor are within the same body
 
 
9. 
Questions from 9 to 15 refer to the enforcement of the prohibition of hard-core cartels.
* On the basis of your experience in advising firms which have been investigated for participation in a hard-core cartel in the last seven years, what are the most common causes for committing such an infringement? Please rank the causes listed below from 1 to 3 (with 1 most common and 3 least common)
Ignorance of the legislation
Ambiguity in the legislation and/or in the decisions of the relevant enforcement body
Disregard of the legislation in pursuit of corporate gain
 
 
10. 
* Suppose that a firm does participate in a hard-core cartel. What is, in your opinion, the probability that this infringement is detected (through an own-initiative investigation, a complaint or a self-report by a whistleblower) and a formal investigation on it is opened? We are only interested in the probability of an infringement being detected and investigated, independently of the result of the investigation (i.e. whether the firm is convicted or acquitted).
 
0% to 5%
 
5% to 10%
 
10% to 20%
 
20% to 30%
 
30% to 40%
 
40% to 60%
 
60% to 80%
 
above 80%
 
Do not know
 
 
11. 
* On the basis of your experience, how has the above probability of detection and investigation of hard-core cartels changed in the last seven years?
 
It is now higher than seven years ago
 
It is now lower than seven years ago
 
It is now the same as seven years ago
 
Do not know
 
 
12. 
* Suppose that a firm does participate in a hard-core cartel, and that the relevant enforcement body detects this behaviour and opens a formal investigation on it. What is, in your opinion, the probability that the guilty firm will be found guilty and that this decision is not going to be reversed in an appeal?
 
0% to 10%
 
10% to 20%
 
20% to 40%
 
40% to 60%
 
60% to 80%
 
above 80%
 
Do not know
 
 
13. 
* On the basis of your experience, how has the above probability of conviction changed in the last seven years?
 
It is now higher than seven years ago
 
It is now lower than seven years ago
 
It is now the same as seven years ago
 
Do not know
 
 
14. 
* Suppose that a firm is investigated for participating in a hard-core cartel, but that the firm is actually not guilty of this behaviour. What is, in your opinion, the probability that the non-guilty firm will be acquitted, if not by the relevant competition enforcement body at least in an appeal proceeding?
 
0% to 20%
 
20% to 40%
 
40% to 60%
 
60% to 80%
 
above 80%
 
Do not know
 
 
15. 
* On the basis of your experience, how has the above probability of acquittal when not guilty of participating in a hard core cartel changed in the last seven years?
 
It is now higher than seven years ago
 
It is now lower than seven years ago
 
It is now the same as seven years ago
 
Do not know
 
 
16. 
Questions from 16 to 22 refer to the enforcement of the prohibition of abuses of dominant position.
* On the basis of your experience in advising firms which have been investigated for abuses of dominant positions in the last seven years, what are the most common causes for committing such an infringement? Please rank the causes listed below from 1 to 3 (with 1 most common and 3 least common).
Ignorance of the legislation
Ambiguity in the legislation and/or in the decisions of the relevant enforcement body
Disregard of the legislation in pursuit of corporate gain
 
 
17. 
* Suppose that a firm does abuse its dominant position. What is, in your opinion, the probability that this infringement is detected and a formal investigation on it is opened? We are only interested in the probability of an infringement being detected and investigated, independently of the result of the investigation (i.e. whether the firm is convicted or acquitted).
 
0% to 5%
 
5% to 10%
 
10% to 20%
 
20% to 30%
 
30% to 40%
 
40% to 60%
 
60% to 80%
 
above 80%
 
Do not know
 
 
18. 
* On the basis of your experience, how has the above probability of detection and investigation of abuses of dominant positions changed in the last seven years?
 
It is now higher than seven years ago
 
It is now lower than seven years ago
 
It is now the same as seven years ago
 
Do not know
 
 
19. 
* Suppose that a firm does abuse its dominant position, and that the relevant enforcement body detects this behaviour and opens a formal investigation on it. What is, in your opinion, the probability that the guilty firm will be found guilty and that this decision is not going to be reversed in an appeal?
 
0% to 10%
 
10% to 20%
 
20% to 40%
 
40% to 60%
 
60% to 80%
 
above 80%
 
Do not know
 
 
20. 
* On the basis of your experience, how has the above probability of conviction changed in the last seven years?
 
It is now higher than seven years ago
 
It is now lower than seven years ago
 
It is now the same as seven years ago
 
Do not know
 
 
21. 

* Suppose that a firm is investigated for an abuse of dominant position, but that the firm is actually not guilty of this behaviour. What is, in your opinion, the probability that the non-guilty firm will be acquitted, if not by the relevant competition enforcement body at least in an appeal proceeding?
 
0% to 20%
 
20% to 40%
 
40% to 60%
 
60% to 80%
 
above 80%
 
Do not know
 
 
22. 
* On the basis of your experience, how has the above probability of acquittal when not guilty of abusing a dominant position changed in the last seven years?
 
It is now higher than seven years ago
 
It is now lower than seven years ago
 
It is now the same as seven years ago
 
Do not know
 
 
23. 
Questions from 23 to 29 refer to the enforcement of the prohibition of other anticompetitive agreements i.e. anticompetitive agreements other than hard-cor cartels.
* On the basis of your experience in advising firms which have been investigated for participating in anticompetitive agreements other than hard-core cartels in the last seven years, what are the most common causes for committing such an infringement? Please rank the causes listed below from 1 to 3 (with 1 most common and 3 least common).
Ignorance of the legislation
Ambiguity in the legislation and/or in the decisions of the relevant enforcement body
Disregard of the legislation in pursuit of corporate gain
 
 
24. 
* Suppose that a firm does participate in an anticompetitive agreement other than a hard-core cartel. What is, in your opinion, the probability that this infringement is detected and a formal investigation on it is opened? We are only interested in the probability of an infringement being detected and investigated, independently of the result of the investigation (i.e. whether the firm is convicted or acquitted).
 
0% to 5%
 
5% to 10%
 
10% to 20%
 
20% to 30%
 
30% to 40%
 
40% to 60%
 
60% to 80%
 
above 80%
 
Do not know
 
 
25. 
* On the basis of your experience, how has the above probability of detection and investigation of anticompetitive agreements other than hard-core cartels changed in the last seven years?
 
It is now higher than seven years ago
 
It is now lower than seven years ago
 
It is now the same as seven years ago
 
Do not know
 
 
26. 
* Suppose that a firm does participate in an anticompetitive agreement other than a hard-core cartel, and that the relevant enforcement body detects this behaviour and opens a formal investigation on it. What is, in your opinion, the probability that the guilty firm will be found guilty and that this decision is not going to be reversed in an appeal?
 
0% to 10%
 
10% to 20%
 
20% to 40%
 
40% to 60%
 
60% to 80%
 
above 80%
 
Do not know
 
 
27. 
* On the basis of your experience, how has the above probability of conviction changed in the last seven years?
 
It is now higher than seven years ago
 
It is now lower than seven years ago
 
It is now the same as seven years ago
 
Do not know
 
 
28. 

* Suppose that a firm is investigated for participating in an anticompetitive agreement other than a hard-core cartel, but that the firm is actually not guilty of this behaviour. What is, in your opinion, the probability that the non-guilty firm will be acquitted, if not by the relevant competition enforcement body at least in an appeal proceeding?
 
0% to 20%
 
20% to 40%
 
40% to 60%
 
60% to 80%
 
above 80%
 
Do not know
 
 
29. 
* On the basis of your experience, how has the above probability of acquittal when not guilty of participating in an anticompetitive agreement other than a hard-core cartel changed in the last seven years?
 
It is now higher than seven years ago
 
It is now lower than seven years ago
 
It is now the same as seven years ago
 
Do not know
 
 
30. 
Questions 30-32 ask your opinion on the deterrence of anticompetitve behaviours. In your opinion, how effective it is the threat of the enforcement of the competition legislation (and of its sanctions) in deterring: A) hard-core cartels, B ) abuses of dominant posision, C) other anti-competitive agreements in your jurisdiction?
Please give a separate answer for each type of anti-competitive behaviour.
* A) hard-core cartels
 
Very effective
 
Effective
 
Not very effective
 
Ineffective
 
Do not know
 
 
 
* 31.  B) abuses of dominant position
 
Very effective
 
Effective
 
Not very effective
 
Ineffective
 
Do not know
 
 
 
* 32.  C) other anti-competitive agreements
 
Very effective
 
Effective
 
Not very effective
 
Ineffective
 
Do not know
 
 
33. 
This question asks your opnion on the deterrence of competitve behaviours.
* How often does the threat of the enforcement of the competition legislation (and of its sanctions) erroneously deters competitive behaviours in your jurisdiction (i.e. induce firms to refrain from adopting conducts that would not reduce, impair or distort competition)?
 
Very often
 
Often
 
Rarely
 
Almost never
 
Do not know
 
 
34. 
During the last seven years you will have advised firms who were considering the possibility of a merger (or acquisition) on the likelihood and nature of the antitrust risks of the deal. Out of this possible mergers (or acquisitions) some may have been abandoned, we are interested in understanding the main reasons that led to this decision. On the basis of your experience, in the last seven years what are the most common causes that have led to possible mergers (or acquisition) being abandoned? Please rank the causes listed below from 1 to 4 (with 1 most common and 4 least common).
Risk of the merger being blocked because of anti-competitive effects
Cost of the remedies that could have been imposed to limit the anti-competitive effects
Lenght of the proceedings for having a merger approved
Cost of the proceeding for having a merger approved
 
 
35. 
* How often do firms abandon mergers that would have not reduced competition because of at least one of the reasons listed in the question above?
 
Very often
 
Often
 
Rarely
 
Almost never
 
Do not know
 
 
 
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